<feed xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"> <id>/</id><title>WHOAMI</title><subtitle>A minimal, responsive, and powerful Jekyll theme for presenting professional writing.</subtitle> <updated>2026-01-07T15:48:31+08:00</updated> <author> <name>WHOAMI</name> <uri>/</uri> </author><link rel="self" type="application/atom+xml" href="/feed.xml"/><link rel="alternate" type="text/html" hreflang="en" href="/"/> <generator uri="https://jekyllrb.com/" version="4.4.1">Jekyll</generator> <rights> © 2026 WHOAMI </rights> <icon>/assets/img/favicons/favicon.ico</icon> <logo>/assets/img/favicons/favicon-96x96.png</logo> <entry><title>Entra ID - Impersonate the Compromised PTA Agent</title><link href="/posts/entra-id-impersonate-the-compromised-pta-agent/" rel="alternate" type="text/html" title="Entra ID - Impersonate the Compromised PTA Agent" /><published>2026-01-07T15:38:36+08:00</published> <updated>2026-01-07T15:48:08+08:00</updated> <id>/posts/entra-id-impersonate-the-compromised-pta-agent/</id> <content src="/posts/entra-id-impersonate-the-compromised-pta-agent/" /> <author> <name>WHOAMI</name> </author> <category term="Microsoft Entra ID" /> <summary> Previous 在上一篇文章 “Entra ID - Attack Surface of Pass-through Authentication (PTA)“ 结尾，我们提到了 Secureworks 曾经发布的一篇名为 “Azure Active Directory Pass-Through Authentication Flaws” 的研究报告，其中深入分析了 PTA 代理所用协议可能被利用的攻击路径。报告指出，Microsoft Entra ID（前称 Azure AD）通过基于证书的身份验证（CBA）对每个 PTA 代理进行身份标识，威胁行为者可通过导出用于身份验证的证书来窃取 PTA 代理身份。被盗的证书可与攻击者控制的 PTA 代理结合，创建难以检测的持久化后门，使得威胁行为者能够收集用户凭据并使用万能密码完成登录。更严重的是，攻击者可在证书到期时自行续期，从而维持长... </summary> </entry> <entry><title>Entra ID - Attack Surface of Pass-through Authentication (PTA)</title><link href="/posts/entra-id-attack-surface-of-pass-through-authentication/" rel="alternate" type="text/html" title="Entra ID - Attack Surface of Pass-through Authentication (PTA)" /><published>2025-12-12T15:12:36+08:00</published> <updated>2026-01-02T23:20:04+08:00</updated> <id>/posts/entra-id-attack-surface-of-pass-through-authentication/</id> <content src="/posts/entra-id-attack-surface-of-pass-through-authentication/" /> <author> <name>WHOAMI</name> </author> <category term="Microsoft Entra ID" /> <summary> Overview Microsoft Entra ID（前称 Azure AD）为混合身份环境提供了三种核心的身份验证方法，包括“密码哈希同步”、“直通身份验证” 和 “联合集成”： 密码哈希同步（Password Hash Synchronization）：将用户本地 AD 密码的哈希值同步到 Microsoft Entra ID，是实现混合身份的默认登录方法。 直通身份验证（Pass-through Authentication）：允许用户在本地和云中使用相同密码进行登录。作为密码哈希同步替代方案，其不需要将用户本地 AD 密码的哈希值同步到 Microsoft Entra ID。 联合集成（Federation Integration）：通过本地 Active Directory 联合身份验证服务（AD FS）基础设施配置混合环境，组织可以将本地环境与 Mic... </summary> </entry> <entry><title>Entra ID - Revisiting the Abuse History of Connect Sync</title><link href="/posts/entra-id-tracing-the-abuse-history-of-connect-sync/" rel="alternate" type="text/html" title="Entra ID - Revisiting the Abuse History of Connect Sync" /><published>2025-10-06T13:26:08+08:00</published> <updated>2025-11-05T12:21:12+08:00</updated> <id>/posts/entra-id-tracing-the-abuse-history-of-connect-sync/</id> <content src="/posts/entra-id-tracing-the-abuse-history-of-connect-sync/" /> <author> <name>WHOAMI</name> </author> <category term="Microsoft Entra ID" /> <summary> Overview Microsoft Entra Connect（前身为 Azure AD Connect）作为微软混合身份环境的核心枢纽，已成为现代企业、组织的身份基础设施中至关重要的组件。它通过在本地 Active Directory 与 Microsoft Entra ID（前身为 Azure AD）之间建立同步桥梁，实现了身份信息的无缝流动。然而，这种强大的连接能力也使其成为攻击者极具吸引力的目标。 本文全面回溯了 Microsoft Entra Connect 同步服务（Connect Sync）的安全风险与攻击面，包括以下内容： 攻击者如何通过获取 Connect Sync 服务器访问权限，进而提取和解密存储在本地数据库中的高权限凭据。这些凭据包括具有 DCSync 权限的本地 AD 连接器账户，以及在 Microsoft Entra ID 中拥有特权角色的云... </summary> </entry> <entry><title>From DPAPI to Chrome - A Journey to Entra ID Takeover</title><link href="/posts/from-dpapi-to-chrome-a-journey-to-entra-id-takeover/" rel="alternate" type="text/html" title="From DPAPI to Chrome - A Journey to Entra ID Takeover" /><published>2025-09-30T18:22:00+08:00</published> <updated>2025-11-05T12:21:12+08:00</updated> <id>/posts/from-dpapi-to-chrome-a-journey-to-entra-id-takeover/</id> <content src="/posts/from-dpapi-to-chrome-a-journey-to-entra-id-takeover/" /> <author> <name>WHOAMI</name> </author> <category term="Windows Security" /> <summary> Overview 随着多因素认证（MFA）的广泛部署，从浏览器中窃取用户密码的利用价值降低，越来越多的攻击者开始转向窃取浏览器 Cookie 作为突破口。然而现代浏览器如 Chrome 和 Edge 大都采用了 Windows 内置的 DPAPI 数据保护机制来加密这些敏感数据。 在本文中，我们将深入探索 DPAPI 的概念和工作原理，解析它如何保护浏览器中的密码和 Cookie，并通过详细的步骤演示攻击者如何在建立立足点后，通过离线提取 MasterKey、破解 Chrome 最新的 App Bound 加密保护，最终成功解密 Cookie 并接管云服务会话的完整攻击链路。 What is DPAPI Data Protection API (DPAPI) 全称 Data Protection Application Programming Interface，是 Micr... </summary> </entry> <entry><title>CVE-2024-50379 &amp;&amp; CVE-2024-56337 - Apache Tomcat RCE via write enabled Default Servlet</title><link href="/posts/apache-tomcat-rce-via-write-enabled-default-servlet/" rel="alternate" type="text/html" title="CVE-2024-50379 &amp;&amp; CVE-2024-56337 - Apache Tomcat RCE via write enabled Default Servlet" /><published>2024-12-20T23:59:00+08:00</published> <updated>2024-12-20T23:59:00+08:00</updated> <id>/posts/apache-tomcat-rce-via-write-enabled-default-servlet/</id> <content src="/posts/apache-tomcat-rce-via-write-enabled-default-servlet/" /> <author> <name>WHOAMI</name> </author> <category term="Java Security" /> <summary> Overview In the process of loading JSP files, Tomcat on MacOS and Windows platforms uses the File.exists() method which is case-insensitive. Therefore, when checking whether a file exists, Tomcat uses conditional competition to load a file similar to “xxx.Jsp” (where the first letter of “xxx.Jsp” is capitalized) and executes it successfully, and finally takes over the server control privilege.... </summary> </entry> </feed>
